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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
R. S. McKNIGHT, ~ Plaintiff, 
vs. 




BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
STATEMEN'T OF ·THE KIND OF CASE 
The instant action is upon 1a petition for cer-
tiorari from the Utah Supreme Court to review a 
decision of the Utah State Land Board holding that 
Erving Wolf was enti tied to lease certain state 
lands pursuant to 'applications filed with the Land 
Board. 
THE PROCEE'DIN'GS BE1LOW 
The Utah State Land Board determined that 
Erving Wolf was the properly qualified applicant 
to lease certain state lands, by virtue of 'a high bid 
upon simultaneous filings of lease applications under 
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Section 65-1-4'5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, by 
Erving Wolf and others. Thereafter, R. J. Hallberg 
and Joseph Sherman, 'also simultaneous applicants, 
filed a protest with the State Land Board and a 
full hearing on the protest was held under the pro-
visions of Section H5-1-9, Utah Code Annotated 
19'53. The Land Board issued Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law supporting the award of le'ases 
to Erving Wolf. The petitioner, R. S. McKnight 
had, subsequent to the simultaneous filing date, 
filed applications to lease covering most of the same 
area as the applications of Erving Wolf. McKnight 
con tended he should be declared the proper lessee 
applicant. After the Land Board's decision, R. S. 
McKnight, who appeared and participated in the 
hearing before the Land Board, sought review of 
the board's decision by writ of certiorari to this 
court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State Land Board seeks !affirmance of its 
decision determining that Erving Wolf is a proper 
lessee of the lands covered by mineral lease applic-
ation numbers 19120, 19'140 and 19141. 
ST~TEMEN'T OF FA:CTS 
'The Land Board adopts the statement of facts 
'appearing in the brief of petitioner, R. S. McKnight, 
as being essentially correct. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE STATE LAND BOARD COULD ALLOW 
ERVING WOLF TO AMEND THE APPLICATIONS 
FILED ON HIS BEHAUF BY VIRTUE OF RULE 6 
OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE UTAH 
STATE LAND BOARD. 
The applications filed in the instant case by 
Erving Wolf were mineral lease applications for 
the purpose of recovering oil and gas (Ex. 1-A) . 
Under the provisions of Section 65-1-97, U.C.A. 
1953, the State Land Board is empowered to adopt 
rules 1and regulations relating to the leasing of state 
lands for the purpose of recovering oil -and gas. 
The section provides : 
"The state land board may make and 
enforce rules and regulations not inconsistent 
with the provisions of this act for carrying 
the same into effect." (Emphasis added.) 
Additionally, Section 6'5-1-6, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"The board may make all needful rules 
and regulations not inconsistent with the pro-
visions of this title for carrying the same into 
effect." 
Thus, the general power of the latter statute 
matches the specific power of the section relating 
to oil and gas leases and allows the Land Board 
to make rules and regulations in aid of carrying 
out the powers otherwise vested in the 'board by 
the Legislature. Acting in pursuit of the authority 
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contained in the above sections, the Utah State Land 
Board promulgated rules for the leasing of min-
eral interests of the state. Rule 6 of these rules pro-
vides in its pertinent part: 
"* * * If an applicant is determined to he 
deficient, it shall be returned to the appli-
cant with instructions for its amendment or 
completion. If the application is resubmitted 
in satisf1actory form within the time speci-
fied in the instructions, it shall retain its 
original filing time. If the application is re-
submitted at any later time, it shall be deemed 
filed at the time of resubmission." 
The provisions of Rule 6 allow the Land Board 
to accept an tamendment to a deficient application 
without loss of priority in time. In the instant case, 
the application of Erving Wolf was found to be 
deficient in the following particulars (R. Finding 
of Fact, p. 3): 
"11. Each of the three applications filed 
by Erving Wolf, namely application numbers 
1'9T20, '19140 1and 19141 were each deficient 
in the following particulars: 
a. ·They were not on current forms pro-
vided by the State Land Board. 
b. They did not include an offer to ac-
cept all of the requirements of the 
provisions of Title 6'5, Chapter 1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 19'53, as amended, 
governing the issuances of oil and gas 
leases 'and operations thereunder. 
c. 'They were not accompanied with a 
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statement under oath, over the appli-
cant's signature, of his qualifications 
as 'an Applicant for Oil and Gas Le'ases 
as defined in Section 6'5-1-88 and as 
required by Section 65-1-88, U.C.A., 
1953, as amended." 
The Land Board determined that Rule '6 allowed 
the correction of these deficiencies ( R. 'Concl. of L., 
p. 8). Petitioner has indicated in his brief, page 
26, that the Attorney General advised the board 
that corrective action would be improper. Actually, 
the Attorney General merely submitted a brief in 
argument on the facts and contended therein that 
Rule 6 should be interpreted as allowing deficiencies 
in applications to be corrected only where they were 
defective on their :Dace. Since the deficiencies in the 
applications of Erving Wolf were not of such a 
nature, the Attorney General contended Rule 6 did 
not apply and that under general principles of pub-
lic land law, all the simultaneous applications should 
be rejected. The Land Board, however, interpreted 
Rule 6 as allowing the correction of deficiencies 
in applications where the deficiency was not ap-
parent on its face. Therefore, the petitioner's theory 
of the case is not actually the issue before the court. 
Courts usually will not override an administrative 
'agency's interpretation of its own rules unless the 
interpretation is obviously arbitrary or erroneous. 
Bowles v. Mannie & Co., 155 F. 2d 12'9 (C.C.A., 
Ill.). ·The Land Board's interpretation of its own 
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rule has the effect, in the absence of unreasonable-
ness, of becoming part of the regulation. Foley v. 
Benedict, 12'2 Tex. 19'3, 15'5 S.W. '2d 805; 42 Am. 
Jur., Public Administrative Law, Sec. 77. The in-
terpretation of Rule 6 by the Land Board is not 
clearly arbitrary, and the language of the rule makes 
no distinction between deficiencies on the face of 
applications and those not readily ·apparent from 
the application itself. Since the language of the rule 
is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation placed 
on it by the Land Board, it cannot be said that the 
Land Board's interpretation was arbitrary. There-
fore, that interpretation must be accepted by the 
court. Equipment Distributors v. Porter, 1'56 F;2d 
296. 
Rule 6, therefore, allows the correction of de-
ficiencies in oil and gas lease applications without 
loss of priority of time. Therefore, the Land Board's 
actions, in allowing the amendment by Erving Wolf 
so as to correct deficiencies in the original appli-
cations, were in accordance with their own rules, 
which have the force of law when properly prom-
ulgated. Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 31'6 U.S. 481 
(
11942) ; United States .ex r.el Accardi v. Shauphn-
essy, 34 7 U.S. '260 ( 1953). 
POINT II. 
RULE 6 OF THE STATE LAND 'BOARD'S RULES 
FOR THE LEASING OF MINERAL INTERESTS ON 
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STATE LANDS IS A VALIDLY PROM1ULGATED RULE 
AND IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH STATUTORY 
LAW. 
Sections 65-1-6 and 65-1-97, U.C.A. 19'53, allow 
the Land Board to promulgate rules to carry out 
its duties which under 65-1-14, U.C.A. 1'9'53, in-
clude the "direction, m'anagement and control" of 
unappropriated state lands. This court has pre-
viously indicated that the Land Board has wide dis-
cretion in the handling and disposition of state 
lands, and that courts will not interfere in the exer-
cise of that discretion unless the hoard acts in ex-
cess of its powers or jurisdiction. 'Thus, in Whitmore 
v. Candland, 47 Utah 7'7, 151 P. 528 (1915), this 
court stated: 
"* * * The whole m:atter of making disposi-
tion of the state's land was placed in the 
hands and under the control of the State Land 
Board. No right of appeal to the courts, or 
of reviewing the board's actions otherwise 
by the courts, except where lack or excess of 
power is 1alleged, has been given. All the 
courts can do, therefore, is to inquire in to and 
determine in a proper proceeding whether 
the board has acted without or in excess of 
its powers or jurisdiction. Courts may notre-
view the acts or conduct of the hoard, for the 
purpose of correcting mere irregularities." 
See also Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55, 61 P. 1534 
(1900); Safarik v. Udall, 304 F. '2d 944 (19612); 
Zarraga v. Texas Co., 284 F. '2d 657 (19160). These 
cases are in keeping with the legislative mandate in 
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Sections 6'5-1-6 and 6'5-1-9'7, U.C.A. 1'95'3, that rules 
are only prohibited where they are "inconsistent 
with the provisions" of statutory law. 'Thus, the only 
issue is whether Rule 6 is consistent or inconsis-
tent with statutory mandates. If the rule is con-
sistent with the Legislature's directive, then the 
petitioner's writ should be V1acated; if not, the writ 
should be made permanent, directing the Land ;Board 
to reject the previous applications of Erving Wolf 
and date the recent applications as of the actual 
date of filing. Olsen v. State Tax Comm., 12 U.2d 
4:2, 361 P. 2d 1112 (19'61) ; Kettner v. Snow, NJl. 
96'59, Utah (October 5, 1962). 
The cases ·cited in petitioner McKnight's brief 
do not concern fact situations where the administra-
tive agency, Secretary of Interior, or Bureau of 
Land Management, had promulgated a rule allowing 
for deficiency amendment without loss of priority 
'and, therefore, are not relevant to this case.1 The 
only real issue of concern is whether Rule 6 is valid, 
or whether it is inconsistent with statutory inter-
diction. Carlson v. Real Estate Comm., 38 H'awaii 
9; Davis, Administration Law Tr,eatise, Sec. 5.03. 
The general rule of construction of statutes and 
regulations is stated in 42 Am. J ur., Public Ad-
ministativ.e Law, Sec. 101: 
1 Even were the federal cases material to the issue presented in the 
instant case, the decision of McKenna v. Seaton, 259 F.2d 780 
(1958), allowed the amendment of a federal oil and gas applica-
tion without loss of priority. 
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"Rules made in the exercise of a power 
delegated by statute should be construed to-
gether with the statute to make, if possible, 
an effectual piece of legislation in harmony 
with common sense and sound reason. The 
same rules of construction which apply to sta-
tutes govern the construction and interpre-
tation of administrative rules and regulations. 
If it can fairly be done, the rule should be 
so construed and applied as to make it con-
form to the powers conferred upon the ad-
ministrative body, rather than as being an 
assumption of power not conferred." 
It is submitted that Rule 6 is not inconsistent 
with Section 65-1-88, U.C.A. '195·3. This section pro-
vides: 
"* * * Applications must be accompanied by 
payment of the filing fee and rental for the 
first year together with a statement under 
oath over applicant's signature of his quali-
fications as required by this act." 
Rule 6 in no way is contrary to this sta:tute, 
nor does the statute prohibit the Land Board from 
allowing applications not meeting the requirements 
of Section 6'5-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, to be corrected 
without loss of priority. Rule ·6 only !allows the cor-
rection of deficiencies in the applications; it does 
not allow the applicant to correct deficiencies in his 
own status if at the time of filing the application 
he is not properly qualified. Therefore, 6'5-1-87, 
U.C.A. 1953, relating to qualifications of applicants, 
is not inconsistent with Rule 6. In the instant case, 
no claim was made that Erving Wolf was not a 
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properly qualified applicant at the time of filing 
the application, but only that the application was 
deficient. Therefore, keeping with the rule that sta-
tutes and administrative regulations should be con-
strued in harmony, Rule 6 should be determined 
not to be inconsistent with statutory directives. 
Further, many good and sufficient reasons 
exist that indicate that the Legislature did not in-
tend Sections 65-1-87 and '88, U. C.A. 1953, to pre-
clude the Land Board from allowing applications 
to be corrected. First, Section 615-1-87, U.C.A. 1953, 
merely sets out the qualifications for an applicant; 
if an applicant meets these qualifications it would 
seem absurd to allow a matter of form to preclude 
the board from issuing a lease that might otherwise 
be more beneficial to the State. This court recog-
nized the merit to such a position in Huber v. Deep 
Creek Irr. Co., 6 U. 2d 115, 305 'P. 2d 478 (1956), 
where the court said with reference to an attack 
on a water right because of the failure to notarize 
an appropriation !application: 
"* * * ·To deny one rights to such water be-
cause, at the possible expense of perjury, one 
did not notarize a final proof form until com-
pletion of all requests and corrections were 
made, some details of which one reasonably 
might believe would bear correction, - as 
here, - also would seem absurd." 
Section 6'5-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, relating to the 
form of oil and gas applications, has as its purpose 
10 
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to make certain that the applicant is qualified. How-
ever, if the board finds that the applicant is quali-
fied, but that the application is not in proper form, 
they would certainly be justified allowing correc-
tion of the application. Not to so allow could be more 
injurious to the State than otherwise. The instant 
case graphically demonstrates this problem. Sec-
tion 65-1-J. U.C.A. 19'53, provides for simultan-
eous filing in certain instances. The instant case 
involved a situation proper for simultaneous ~ling. 
In cases of simultaneous filing, Section 65-1-46' (b), 
U.C.A. t9'53, provides that the Land Board shall 
issue leases to the highest bidded. The bids in the 
instant case were as follows: 
Erving Wolf 
No. 19120 No. 19140 No. 19141 
$2.59/acre $12.59/acre $2.59/acre 
Joseph Sherman 
R. J. Hallberg 
$'2.01/acre $'2.34/acre $2.34/acre 
Paul 8. Callister 
R. S. McKnight 
$1.00/acre $1.00/acre $1.00/acre 
Thus, if it were to be held that R. S. McKnight's 
position is correct, the State would stand to lose 
$1.59 per annum on the encompassed lands. The 
applications include approximately 2100 acres which 
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For these reasons, it is submitted that the Land 
Board was fully justified in promulgating Rule 6 
to allow for corrected applications without loss of 
priority and, further, that no clear inconsistency 
between the rule and statutory l'aw exists. There-
fore, the board's decision should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is generally conceded that governmental 
agencies, charged with administrative responsibility, 
must have reasonable l:a:titude in carrying out func-
tions and duties of their administrative office. The 
State Land Board has attempted, by promulgating 
Rule 6, to provide a proper and reasonable means 
to assist in the leasing of state lands. There is noth-
ing explicitly prohibitive of such regulation in sta-
tutory law, or nothing inconsistent with the reason-
able interpretations of Title 65, dealing with oil 
and gas leasing on state lands. 
It is, therefore, submitted that the Land Board's 
action should be affirmed and the writ of certiorari 
vacated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRA'T'T KE'SLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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